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THE DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD OF ACADEMIC
FREEDOM: CUTTING THE SCALES OF
JUSTICE IN TITLE VII LITIGATION
Prior to 1972, academic institutions enjoyed immunity from Title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.' The 1972 amendments to Title VII re-
moved the statutory exemption. Academic institutions, however, con-
tinue to enjoy a de facto immunity predicated upon the doctrine of
academic freedom.
Few contend that Congress lacks the power to apply Title VII to aca-
demic institutions.2 The subtle impact of academic freedom, however,
invidiously deprives Congress of its power. The plaintiff in an academic
employment discrimination suit, like any plaintiff, bears the ultimate bur-
den of proof.3 Yet courts under the rubric of academic freedom erect an
array of barriers to the plaintiff's ability to prove her case.
To assert that academic freedom confers no license to discriminate
misstates the issue.4 The issue, often expressed as a constitutional propo-
sition,5 is, in reality, a matter of systematized analysis of complex fact
1. Congress initially exempted academic institutions from coverage by Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act with respect to their professional employees under the following provision:
[t]his subchapter shall not apply... to an educational institution with respect to the em-
ployment of individuals to perform work connected with the educational activities of such
institution.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 702 as amended by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1.
2. The applicable prohibitions are as follows:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
(I) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). For full text of Title VII see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. See also Young, Sex
Discrimination in Higher Education, 5 Civ. LIB. REV. 41, 41 (No.2, 1978) [hereinafter "Sex Discrim-
ination"] ("Congress issued a strong mandate that discrimination be eliminated from educational
institutions"); and Cooper, Title VII in the Academy: Barriers to Equality for Faculty Women, 16
U.C. DAy. L. REV. 975, 979 (1983) [hereinafter "Barriers"] ("Title VII has erected powerful chal-
lenges to traditional employment practices").
3. Eg., Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1980) (plaintiff in a
disparate treatment case retains the ultimate burden of proof).
4. See Powell v. Syracuse University, 580 F.2d 1150, 1154 (2nd Cir. 1978) (academic freedom
does not include the freedom to discriminate).
5. See Note, Academic Freedom and Federal Regulation of University Hiring, 92 HARV. L.
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patterns.
Courts can and should balance the competing interests of Title VII
plaintiffs and academic institutions. This Note argues that the current
judicial approach to academic employment discrimination imposes un-
reasonable burdens upon the plaintiff. The Note also argues, however,
that courts should not tip the scales too far in the opposite direction and
completely disregard legitimate academic concerns.
Part I explores the doctrine of academic freedom and some of the
unique features of the academic selection process. Part II introduces the
traditional disparate treatment approach and its application to academic
institutions. Part III focuses on a unique aspect of the problem-disclo-
sure of traditionally confidential peer review materials. Parts IV and V
of this Note offer a method for analyzing academic Title VII claims,
which endeavors to strike a more equitable balance between plaintiffs and
academic institutions.
I. THE FREEDOM TO DECIDE WHO MAY TEACH
The Supreme Court has never precisely held that the first amendment
encompasses academic freedom.6 Colleges and universities, however,
serve a unique and important role in our society. An approach that ig-
nores the policies behind academic freedom in favor of Title VII con-
cerns serves no one's best interests. Consequently, access to the inner
sanctum of education's "ivory towers" becomes meaningless if the qual-
ity of higher education suffers in the process.
REV. 879 (1979) [hereinafter "Academic Freedom"] (arguing that academic freedom is constitution-
ally protected) and Tepker, Title VII, Equal Employment Opportunity, and Academic Autonomy:
Toward a Principled Deference, 16 U. C. DAV. L. REV. 1047 (1983) [hereinafter "Principled Defer-
ence"] (advocating a more policy based approach in favor of judicial deference to academic decision-
making); but see Stacy and Holland, Legal and Statistical Problems in Litigating Sex Discrimination
Claims in Higher Education, 11 J. of C. & U. L. 107 (1984) [hereinafter "Statistical Problems"] and
Bartholet, Application of Title Vi to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 947 (1982) [hereinafter
"Jobs in High Places"]. Each of the last two articles advocates application of the more rigorous
disparate impact test to academic employment discrimination suits. Courts have consistently ap-
plied the disparate treatment test, however.
6. Contra, Note, Academic Freedom, supra note 5 at 881. The author contends that the
Supreme Court elevated academic freedom to first amendment status in Sweezy v. New Hampshire.
The logic of this assertion, drawn largely from dicta, is fundamentally flawed. The court in Sweezy
focused on vagueness and the deprivation of individual rights within an academic context. See infra
notes 7-14 apd accompanying text.
[Vol. 65:445
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A. From Individual Freedom to Institutional Autonomy
In Sweezy v. New Hampshire, Justice Frankfurter stated that academic
freedom permits an educational institution to "determine for itself on
academic grounds who may teach, what shall be taught, how it shall be
taught, and who may be admitted to study."7 Sweezy 8 and other early
decisions relating to academic freedom,9 however, dealt primarily with
government efforts to influence either curriculum or the professor's poli-
tics.' ° The Court in these cases refrained from holding that all govern-
ment interference with academia violated the first amendment. Instead,
the Court relied upon the hazy contours of the anti-communist investiga-
tions, '1 and held that the government action violated the vagueness doc-
trine. 2 The Court expressed "special concern"' 3 about government
actions that could chill exercises of first amendment rights in an aca-
demic setting. 4 These decisions suggested that the Court would care-
fully guard against government suppression of individual rights within
academia.
7. 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). It is ironic that this statement,
which Frankfurter took from a conference of South African educators, opposed to racial discrimina-
tion, should become the foundation for arguments against applying equal employment laws to
academia.
8. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
9. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of New York, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); and Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). These cases arose
during the McCarthy era and dealt with government anti-communist activities directed against
educators.
10. In Sweezy, the state made direct inquiries into the contents of Sweezy's lectures and his
political affiliations. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 249-50. Keyishian contained the same focus on government
actions aimed directly at influencing the philosophical content of education. The Court stated, "the
First Amendment ... does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom."
Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603. As these cases suggest, it is the nature of the government's action rather
than the academic context that raises the first amendment concerns.
11. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 254-55. The Court specifically held that the overbroad state investiga-
tion violated Sweezy's fourteenth amendment due process rights. Id.
12. Id. See also Weiman, 344 U.S. 183 (test oaths particularly prone to challenges for over-
breadth and vagueness).
13. Keynishian, 385 U.S. at 603.
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcen-
dent value to all of us... [t]hat freedom is a special concern of the First Amendment...
Id.
14. Shelton, 364 U.S. at 487 ("The vigilant protection of constitutional freedom is nowhere
more vital than in the community of American schools."). Again the court implied that the first
amendment issues arise independent of academic freedom. The academic context served to heighten
the Court's concern, because of education's close nexus to the "marketplace of ideas." These cases
did not involve any institutional claims to academic freedom.
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Some lower courts have suggested that traditional concepts of aca-
demic freedom require more, rather than less, vigorous enforcement of
Title VII.15 In In re Dinnan 16 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated
that employment discrimination provided a more effective means of sup-
pressing individual expression than government enforcement of Title
VII.17 This argument comports with the tenure system's basic philoso-
phy, which seeks to insulate individual academicians from institutional
pressures. 8
Academic institutions, on the other hand, have singled out Frank-
furter's dictum in Sweezy 19 and argued for institutional autonomy. Ac-
cording to universities, faculty selection is an essential component in
controlling the "idea" content of education.20 Their argument has two
prongs. First, courts lack the expertise necessary to evaluate academic
15. E.g., E.E.O.C v. Univ. of Notre Dame du lac, 715 F.2d 331, 337 (7th Cir. 1983) (unlawful
tenure decisions frustrate the goal of academic excellence); and Gray v. Bd. of Higher Educ., City of
New York, 692 F.2d 901, 909 (2d Cir. 1982) (academic freedom is illusory when it serves as a veil for
censorship rather than a protection against censorious practices).
16. 661 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1981).
17. Id. at 430. Distinguishing Sweezy and the related line of cases, supra notes 9-10, the court
said:
[I]n all of those cases there was an attempt to suppress ideas by the government .... [T]hese
issues are not presented in the instant case. Here a private plaintiff is attempting to enforce
her [rights]. Id. (emphasis by the court).
The court also stated:
Though we recognize the importance of academic freedom, we must also recognize its
limits. The public policy of the United States prohibits discrimination; Professor Dinnan
and the University of Georgia are not above that policy. Id. at 431.
18. According to the American Association of University Professors (A.A.U.P.):
Tenure is a nieans to certain ends, specifically:
(1) Freedom of teaching and research and of extramural activities and (2) a sufficient de-
gree of economic security to make the profession attractive to men and women of ability.
Freedom and economic security, and hence, tenure are indispensable to the success of an
institution in fulfilling its obligations to its students and to society. A.A. UP. Policy Docu-
ments & Reports, pg. 3 (1984).
19. Supra note 7.
20. See Hill and Hill, Employment Discrimination: A Rollback of Coufidentiality in University
Tenure Procedures?, 22 AM. Bus. L. J. 209, 210-12 (1984) [hereinafter "Rollback of Confidential-
ity"] (there is a close relationship between academic freedom and the peer review process). The
Seventh Circuit raised a similar theme in University of Notre Dame:
It is clear that the peer review process is essential to the very lifeblood and heart of aca-
demic excellence... The process of peer evaluation [is] the best and most reliable method
of promoting academic freedom and excellence .... 715 F.2d at 336.
See also Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60, 67-68 (2d Cir. 1980) (courts should not "second-guess"
scholarly opinions); Faro v. New York Univ., 502 F.2d 1150, 1157 (2d Cir. 1974) ("education and
faculty appointments at a University level are [ill]-suited for federal court supervision"); and John-
son v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 435 F. Supp. 1328, 1353 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (the court is not a "Super
Tenure Committee").
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credentials and determine who is qualified for tenure or promotion.21 Ju-
dicial interference thus could undermine the quality of higher educa-
tion.22 Second, Title VII could become a pretext for content-motivated
interference with academia.
Although these arguments are somewhat inapposite to the first amend-
ment's primary concern for individual expression, they are not entirely
without merit. The Supreme Court has, in other areas of constitutional
law, bridged the gap from individual privacy to autonomy.23 Beyond
this, academic institutional autonomy is consistent with the tradition of
minimizing government intervention in the mediums of expression.24
Academic freedom presents a double-edged sword that requires courts to
exercise caution and precision when confronted with academic employ-
ment discrimination suits. 25
B. The "On Academic Grounds" Requirement
In Rollins v. Farris26 a federal district court suggested that a univer-
sity's right to autonomous decisionmaking would stop where its discrimi-
21. See authorities cited supra note 20. Other courts have refrained from adopting an explicit
deference to university decisionmakers, but have nonetheless expressed reluctance to question aca-
demic judgments. See eg., Namenwirth v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 769 F.2d
1235, 1242-43 (7th Cir. 1985) ("to allow the decisionmaker also to act as the source of judgments
would ordinarily defeat the purpose of the discrimination laws; [b]ut in the case of tenure decisions
we see no alternative"); Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d 85, 93 (2d Cir. 1984) (courts cannot hope
to master the field of academics sufficiently enough to review the merits of tenure decisions); and
Powell v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d 1150, 1157 (2d Cir. 1978) (judicial reluctance to intervene moti-
vated by recognition of academicians' superior expertise).
22. Tepker, Principled Deference, supra note 5 at 1081 (universities must compete with one
another in the "intellectual marketplace" for faculty members and students). But cf Young, Sex
Discrimination, supra note 2 at 41 (the most prestigious universities often have the fewest women
faculty members).
23. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); and Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
24. See Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 262 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("[t]hese pages need not be bur-
dened with proof ... of the dependence of a free society on free universities").
25. The unique position of academia in the development of ideas raises first amendment con-
cerns and makes government intervention suspect. The government has an obligation, however, to
insure that benefits of higher education are "freely" available to all. As the Fifth Circuit said:
[I]f the concept of academic freedom were extended as far as the [university] argues, it
would rapidly become a double-edged sword threatening the very core of the values it now
protects. Dinnan, 661 F.2d at 426.
26. 39 F.E.P. 1102, 1105 (E.D. Ark. 1985). The court in Rollins quoted Frankfurter's classic
description of academic freedom from Sweezy, supra note 7. The Rollins Court emphasized the
phrase on academic grounds to delineate what it perceived as the limit of academic autonomy. 39
F.E.P. at 1105.
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nation had begun. The difficulty lies, however, in determining when
discrimination has been a motivating factor in a university's decision. A
court cannot always determine the true basis for a particular decision
with accuracy because the academic selection process is extremely com-
plex.27 Most tenure and promotion decisions involve peer evaluation and
committee deliberations. Vague criteria and subjective, decentralized
decisionmaking inhere in this process. 28
The tenure system is closely intertwined with academic freedom and
the maintenance of quality in higher education.29 A university could not
easily list the ingredients necessary for good teaching or scholarship.
Additionally, the needs of a particular institution change over time.30 A
candidate must not merely pass scholastic muster, she must also fulfill a
need arising at the time of her candidacy.3 Universities must, therefore,
rely on a selection process that substantially involves subjective decisions.
Courts have been extremely suspicious of subjective employment deci-
sions in other contexts, because subjectivity allows greater latitude for
arbitrary action. The legitimacy of the academic selection process itself,
27. See Zahorik, 729 F.2d at 92-93. Prof. Tepker stated:
These intangible qualities [academic qualifications] can only be discerned and judged on
the basis of subjective criteria, and even then, not without debate or controversy. An edu-
cator must deal with resistance from the advocates of conventional ideas and from skepti-
cal colleagues. The educator must contend with the subjective judgments, intellectual
criticism, and occasionally bitter opposition of other academicians on issues of controversy.
Persuasiveness, teaching skill, and academic merit are in the eye of the beholder. Princi-
pled Deference, supra note 5 at 1081.
28. The unique features of the academic selection process make judicial review more difficult.
First, the process is decentralized. Several different individuals and committees collaborate on each
decision. Discrimination by one or more actors may or may not affect the final outcome. Second,
the decisionmakers employ criteria covering a broad range of intangible qualities, for example, teach-
ing, scholarship, and service. Third, the standards are non-specific and subjective. Additionally,
academic employment is often non-competitive. Candidates compete against a "standard" rather
than against one another for specific slots.
29. See supra notes 20 & 21. The court in Johnson stated:
Menure is... a distinctive honor... not to be accorded to all assistant professors. Such
decision [awarding tenure] by its very nature... must be mde by the faculty, the adminis-
tration, and the trustees of the university. 435 F. Supp. at 1353.
30. See Banerjee v. Board of Trustees of Smith College, 648 F.2d 61 (Ist Cir. 1981). The plain-
tiff contended that the college had tested his qualifications against a higher standard than that used
in prior decisions. According to the court, "this was because the times were favorable for doing so,
and not in order to discriminate against the plaintiff." Id. at 66.
31. See Smith v. University of N.C., 632 F.2d 316, 343 (4th Cir. 1980) (plaintiff denied tenure
because she was a "specialist" and school needed a "generalist").
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however, is not subject to serious challenge.3 2 Courts recognize the rela-
tionship between the process and the school's interest in selecting a qual-
ity faculty.
The legitimacy of the peer review system has important consequences
for the plaintiff. First, legitimacy insulates the academic selection pro-
cess from facial challange under the disparate impact branch of Title VII
jurisprudence.3 Therefore, the academic plaintiff must proceed under
the more difficult disparate treatment theory, challenging the process as
applied to her. Second (as discussed more fully in Part II), the subjective
nature of the process makes it more difficult for a plaintiff to prove her
case.
II. THE NECESSITY AND DIFFICULTY OF PROVING INTENT
Unlike the plaintiff in a disparate impact suit, the plaintiff in a dispa-
rate treatment suit must prove intent to discriminate.3 4 In a disparate
impact suit, if the plaintiff shows that a particular selection device has a
disproportionate effect on minority opportunity, the burden of persua-
sion shifts to the defendant, and the employer must show that the chal-
lenged practice serves a necessary business purpose. In a disparate
treatment suit, however, proof of statistical disparity imposes only a pro-
duction burden on the defendant.3 6
32. E.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) and Rowe v. General Motors
Corp., 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972).
The court in Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh, 435 F. Supp. 1328 (W.D. Pa. 1977) stated:
[U]nder Rowe (citation omitted) in a case where there are no criteria for promotion except
the unfeathered recommendation of a foreman this can become a ready mechanism to con-
ceal discrimination. In the instant case however the criteria contained in the faculty hand-
book were as definite as possible considering the elusive nature of professional
qualifications and teaching ability. Id. at 1357.
Contra, Bartholet, Jobs in High Places, supra note 5 (tradition and legitimacy are not synonymous
with necessity-the usual standard governing whether subjective decisionmaking is permissible).
33. Cf Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (disparate impact operates to invalidate
an employment practice having an adverse impact on minority opportunity, regardless of intent).
34. Proof of intent is actually the rule in equal protection cases, though the Court has recog-
nized a few limited exceptions. See, e.g., Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 217 (1980) (Congress may
prohibit voting practices having a disparate impact without regard to intent) and Keyes v. School
Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 217 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (advocating explicit abandonment of
intent requirement in school desegregation). In Griggs the Court held that "practices, procedures, or
tests neutral on their face and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to
'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices." 401 U.S. at 430.
35. Griggs, 401 U.S. 424.
36. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1980); Board of Trustees
1987]
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A. The Necessity
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green 37 the Supreme Court prescribed
the allocation of the burden of proof in a disparate treatment suit.38 Be-
cause direct proof of intent is usually unavailable, the plaintiff must rely
on circumstantial evidence and the totality of facts. Under the three-step
McDonnell Douglas approach, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of es-
tablishing a prima facie case of discrimination, usually by showing that
members of a non-protected class received the position for which plaintiff
applied.39 The evidence raises an inference of discrimination if it indi-
cates that the plaintiff was similarly qualified. The burden then shifts to
the employer to articulate legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for his
decision.'
Finally, the plaintiff must prove that the employer's articulated rea-
sons are a mere pretext for discrimination.4 During this phase, the
of Keene State College v. Sweeney (Sweeney I), 439 U.S. 24 (1978); and Furco Contr. Co. v. Wa-
ters, 438 U.S. 567, 576-78 (1978).
37. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
38. Justice Rehnquist later described this approach as follows:
The method suggested in McDonnell Douglas for pursuing this inquiry, however, was never
intended to be rigid, mechanical, or ritualistic. Rather it is merely a sensible, orderly way
to evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the critical question
of discrimination.
Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577.
39. The Court stated:
This [establishing a prima facie case] may be done by showing (i) that [plaintiff] belongs to
a [protected] minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the em-
ployer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and
(iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants from persons of the plaintiff's qualifications. 411 U.S. at 802.
40. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55 (defendant satisfies production by "rais[ing] a genuine issue
of fact as to whether [he] discriminated against the plaintiff"); Sweeney I, 439 U.S. 24 (merely articu-
lating legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons sufficiently answers prima facie case); and Furnco, 438
U.S. at 577 (employer dispels adverse inferences of prima facie case by mere articulation of legiti-
mate, non-discriminatory reasons for his actions). (emphasis added). In Burdine, the Court offered
the following explanation for imposing only a burden of articulation:
Placing [the] burden of production on the defendant... serves simultaneously to meet the
plaintiff's prima facie case by presenting legitimate reasons for the action and to frame the
factual issues with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity
to demonstrate pretext. 450 U.S. at 256.
The Court then provided three reasons why this would not hinder the plaintiff:
(1) The defendant has an obligation to state clear and reasonably specific reasons;
(2) Despite the lack of a formal persuasion burden the defendant has an incentive to con-
vince the court that his conduct was lawful; and
(3) Liberal rules of discovery assist the plaintiff in carrying the ultimate burden.
Id. at 258.
41. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. Specifically the Court stated:
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plaintiff can address her arguments to specific factual issues. Plaintiffs
depend on three methods to prove pretext: (1) challenges to the factual
basis of the employment decision;42 (2) comparisions between the plain-
tiff and those similarly situated;43 and (3) introduction of direct evidence
of discrimination." This approach rests on the premise that unexplained
arbitrary actions raise an inference of impermissible discrimination.45
Thus, by attacking the factual or logical credibility of the defendant's
reasons, the plaintiff attempts to leave them "unexplained" in the eyes of
the court.
4 6
The Supreme Court tacitly appoved application of this traditional
formula to academic Title VII suits in Sweeny v. Keene State College,
(Sweeny 1)." Application of the formula has never been easy. Courts
have erected ad hoc barriers that either impair a plaintiff's access to evi-
dence or limit the inference drawn therefrom.4" Furthermore, subjective
The plaintiff may also introduce evidence as to the employer's treatment of the plaintiff
prior to the complained of act, and evidence of the employer's general policy and practices
towards minority employment.
Id. at 804-05.
42. The plaintiff may introduce evidence that her qualifications are in fact different than as
claimed by the employer, and that her actual qualifications meet the articulated criteria. For exam-
ple, if the college requires a particular degree as a condition of employment, and claims that the
plaintiff did not possess such degree, the plaintiff could prove pretext by showing that she actually
had the requisite degree. See Sweeney v. Bd. of Trustees of Keene State College, (Sweeney II), 604
F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1980).
43. Most agree that "comparison evidence"-proof that similarly situated individuals received
differential treatment-is the most probative of discrimination. See Cooper, Barriers, supra note 2 at
991 ("The qualifications of the plaintiff and those treated more favorably, and the correct evaluation
and application of those qualifications, are the essence of a disparate treatment case.").
44. Direct evidence includes the following: prior unfair treatment of plaintiff by the employer;
prejudicial or biased statements attributable to decisionmakers; irregularities in the procedures used
for reaching the challenged employment decision; and statistical disparities in faculty composition or
a history of employment discrimination. This evidence, though highly probative of discriminatory
animus, often provides no connection between improper intent and the complained of employment
decision. The plaintiff must also show "that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination."
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. But see Kunda v. Myhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1980)
(failure to advise plaintiff concerning degree requirement is prior unfair treatment showing pretext).
45. "A prima facie case... raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume these
acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible
factors .... " Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577.
46. For explanations of the functional underpinnings of the McDonnell Douglas approach see
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, and Furnco, 438 U.S. 567.
47. 439 U.S. 24 (1978). The Court simply remanded per curiam for reconsideration in light of
Furnco. In Sweeney 1, the lower courts used language suggesting the imposition of a persuasion
burden on the college during rebuttal. The Court has yet to address any other issue in academic
Title VII litigation.
48. Some courts have limited the plaintiff's access to confidential peer review materials. See
Washington University Open Scholarship
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evaluation itself provides a legally acceptable explanation for many seem-
ingly arbitrary actions.49
B. The Difficulty
In early academic Title VII cases, courts explicitly refused to compare
the qualifications of different candidates. For example, in Lieberman v.
Gant, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court's
exclusion of comparison evidence on the grounds that such inquiries ex-
ceeded judicial expertise.5" The Court held that a plaintiff must show
"demonstrably superior" qualifications as a prerequisite to the introduc-
tion of comparison evidence. 51 Because the essence of disparate treat-
ment is the differential treatment of similarly situated individuals,
comparison evidence is the most reliable means of proving pretext.5 2
Thus, adherence to the Lieberman53 holding would prevent all but the
most highly qualified plaintiffs from proving intent.
The courts have abandoned this approach in recent cases. In
Namenwirth v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin the Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals explicitly rejected the defendant's sugges-
tion that judicial comparisons were per se improper.5 4  The court
E.E.O.C. v. University of Notre Dame du lae, 715 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1983); Gray v. Board of Higher
Educ., City of New York, 692 F.2d 901 (2nd Cir. 1982); Jepsen v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 610 F.2d
1379 (5th Cir. 1980); and Keyes v. Lenoir Ryne College, 552 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1977).
Other courts, acting under a self-imposed deference to academic decisionmaking, have limited the
probative value of certain evidence. See Namenwirth v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis.
System, 769 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1985); Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d 85 (2nd Cir. 1984);
Banerjee v. Board of Trustees of Smith College, 648 F.2d 61 (1st Cir. 1981); Smith v. University of
N.C., 632 F.2d 316 (4th Cir. 1980); Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60 (2nd Cir. 1980); Farlow v.
University of N.C., 624 F. Supp. 434 (M.D.N.C. 1985); Peters v. Middlebury College, 409 F. Supp.
857 (D. Vt. 1976).
49. Tenure is traditionally awarded strictly on the basis of academic judgments. Beyond this,
courts have no independent standard for determining if a plaintiff is qualified. See Namennwirth, 769
F.2d at 1243 (lack of identifiable benchmark complicates the court's task).
50. 630 F.2d 60, 63 (2nd Cir. 1980) (lower court did not err by refusing to engage in "tired-
eyed" study of a plaintiff's proferred comparison evidence).
51. Id. at 67-68.
52. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804 (evidence that employer retained members of non-
protected group, who had qualifications similar to plaintiff's is "particularly probative").
53. 630 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1980).
54. 769 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1985). The court held:
The state ... has argued ... that comparisons are out of place in tenure decisions. We
disagree. Comparisons may be more difficult in the case of professional and academic
employment decisions, but they may be essential to a determination of discrimination; and
where they are and where the evidence is available, they must be made.
Id. 1240-41.
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conceded, however, that such comparisons were limited as a practical
matter, because essentially, courts must compare the academic evalua-
tions of the different candidates' qualifications rather than the qualifica-
tions themselves. 5 Courts refuse independently to reassess qualifications
in academic situations. Under this presumption of evaluator accuracy,
the opinions of the plaintiff's colleagues form the factual basis of any
judicial comparison.
The presumption of accuracy poses several problems for a plaintiff.
First, because peer evaluations are expressed in conclusory terms, a court
cannot make detailed comparisons, or analyze candidate qualifications in
depth. Second, the presumption of accuracy ignores the potential for dis-
criminatory animus within the plaintiff's peer group. Finally, for all
practical purposes, the presumption is irrebuttable.56
Namenwirth demonstrates this final flaw. As stated above, courts
rarely question the sufficiency of the school's articulated explanation. 7
First, courts accept any subtle difference between candidates as a legiti-
mate reason for differential treatment. Because universities rely on
broadly based criteria, some differences will inevitably exist. In
55. Id. at 1243. The court stated that "[ilf we consider the department vote as an assessment of
[plaintiff's] qualifications by experts in the field-and there is no doubt that it is that-then the
University's denial of tenure is based on rather hard evidence that Namenwirth was not as well
qualified as those who were granted tenure." Namenwirth, 769 F.2d at 1242. Other courts have
referred to this as "deference to academic expertise" or "refusal to second-guess academic profes-
sionals." This Note prefers the term "presumption of evaluator accuracy."
56. See Farlow, 624 F. Supp. at 438 (the court was "particularly disturbed" by the sexist re-
marks of male colleagues but did not find for the plaintiff on the issue of pretext).
57. The court in Namenwirth literally threw up its hands, and concluded that there was no
alternative to accepting academic evaluations as an accurate characterization of the plaintiff's quali-
fications. 769 F.2d at 1242-43. Other courts have used different characterizations in expressing their
refusal to cross the same threshold. See, e.g., Zahorik, 729 F.2d at 93 (court cannot hope to resolve
differences of scholarly opinion); Lieberman, 630 F.2d at 67-68 (court should refrain from "second-
guess[ing]" scholarly opinions); Johnson, 435 F. Supp. at 1357 (the tenured faculty is in the best
position to judge academic qualifications); Peters, 409 F. Supp. at 868-69 (denial of contract renewal
based on professional judgments; a decision defendants may make without judicial interference); and
Greene v. Board of Regents of Texas Tech. Univ., 335 F. Supp. 249, 250 (N.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd,
474 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1973) (courts reluctant to overrule the judgments of those possessing exper-
tise in the field). Even statements facially supportive of vigorous Title VII enforcement contain
qualifiers based on deference to academic expertise. See, e.g., Powell, 580 F.2d at 1153 (recognition
of "relative institutional competencies"-as between colleges and courts-should not be extended to
an anti-interventionist policy, immunizing academic instititutions from Title VII).
Powell marked a shift in judicial attitudes toward application of Title VII to universities. Powell
repudiated, to some extent, an earlier Second Circuit decision, which advocated an explicit "hands-
off" approach. See Faro v. New York Univ., 502 F.2d 1229, 1232 (2d Cir. 1974) (Congress might
just as well enact a law providing for formal appeal of all academic employment decisions).
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Namenwirth 58 and in Farlow v. University of North Carolina,9 both
plaintiffs attempted to show that a similarly qualified male candidate had
been promoted, while plaintiff had not. In both cases the courts con-
cluded that a tenure committee could have legitimately reached different
conclusions.60 A plaintiff cannot prove a disparate treatment claim if a
court will not permit her to demonstrate that she was "similarly
situated."
Unqualified acceptance of a school's articulated reasons permits a de-
fendant to select the most legally defensible grounds as an explanation.
Judicial decisions suffer from the lack of any benchmark standard by
which to judge the fairness of a particular academic employment deci-
sion. 61 In a non-academic disparate treatment suit, the plaintiff first at-
tempts to show that she was qualified for the position.62 In the academic
context, however, courts have no standard by which to measure a plain-
tiff's initial qualification for the position.63
As the above discussion indicates, after Lieberman, the courts' willing-
ness to review academic employment decisions is still largely superfi-
cial. 64 The courts, still fearful of becoming super-tenure committees,
refrain from reviewing the substance of a challenged academic decision.
However, the plaintiff, under the McDonnell Douglas approach, has little
chance of proving pretext in the absence of meaningful substantive re-
view. 65 This defacto immunity, predicated upon limited juicial review, is
as effective as a de jure exemption.
Additionally, the plaintiff faces other obstacles. Courts are reluctant
58. 769 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1985).
59. 624 F. Supp. 434 (M.D.N.C. 1985).
60. Namenwirth, 769 F.2d 1235 and Farlow, 624 F. Supp. 434.
61. Namenwirth, 764 F.2d at 1243. The plaintiff's ability to challenge the factual assumptions
underlying the university's decision (i.e.: faculty evaluations) is crucial. Proof of pretext turns on
showing that the defendant's proferred reasons are unworthy of belief. See Banerjee, 648 F.2d at 64
("As Burdine points out... the best way of proving a bad reason [is] to show the incorrectness of the
claimed good one").
62. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
63. Namenwirth, 769 F.2d at 1243.
64. The fate of academic employees under Title VII has run the gambit of employer immunity,
from a dejure legislative immunity, supra note 1, to a dejure judicial immunity, supra note 20, to a
de facto judicial immunity, supra note 21. See also supra note 57. Lieberman and Namenwirth are
illustrative. The difference between an explicit refusal to entertain comparison evidence, Lieberman,
630 F.2d at 63, and a willingness to entertain limited comparison, Namenwirth, 769 F.2d at 1243, is
a difference in form not substance. This difference in attitude does not affect the outcome of the
litigation.
65. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804 (comparison evidence usually most probative).
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to draw inferences by comparing non-competitive66 decisions, particu-
larly when universities reach each decision at different times and under
different circumstances.67 Courts often require the plaintiff to limit com-
parisons to a particular department, refusing to entertain university-wide
comparisons.68 Most departments make relatively few decisions during
the relevant time period.69 Thus the available evidence may be insuffi-
cient to establish a significant pattern of discrimination.
C. Proving Pretext
The plaintiff in an academic Title VII suit must rely more heavily upon
direct, rather than circumstantial, evidence of discrimination.7' This evi-
dence includes incidents of harassment, biased statements, and proce-
dural irregularities. This type of evidence has two serious shortcomings.
First, its availability is often fortuitous.71 Educated people are particu-
larly capable of reaching a discriminatory decision without outward
manifestations of prejudice. Conversely, a few prejudicial remarks do
not prove conclusively that the decision was tainted. This is particularly
true in academia, where a number of decisionmakers have an input.72
Second, this evidence is often less probative than other types, because the
66. See Zahorik, 729 F.2d at 92.
67. See Baneree, 648 F.2d at 66 (tenure standards may vary according to school's needs at a
particular time).
68. See Zahorik, 729 F.2d at 95 ("gross statistical evidence, with few figures relevant to plain-
tiff's department" was properly excluded).
69. See Stacy and Holland, Statistical Problems, supra note 5.
70. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05 (other relevant evidence includes prior treat-
ment during employment and the employer's general attitude towards minority hiring). In the aca-
demic context, see Zahorik, 729 F.2d at 93 (procedural irregularities and conventional evidence of
bias cast doubt on the good faith of decision); Laborde v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 686 F.2d 715, 717
(9th Cir. 1982) (statistical proof goes to prima facie case); and Lynn, 656 F.2d at 1343 (diminished
opinion of women's issues and those who concentrate on the study of women's issues is indicative of
discriminatory animus).
71. See Lieberman, 630 F.2d at 70 (no link between "jocular" remarks by male professors and
adverse tenure decision) and Farlow, 624 F.2d at 439 (independent evidence of discrimination insuffi-
cient in light of plaintiff's failure to prove that she was "qualified" for promotion).
72. See Zahorik, 729 F.2d at 95 ("more particularized evidence relating to the individual plain-
tiffs is necessary to show disparate treatment"); Laborde, 686 F.2d at 717 (statistics, though compe-
tent to establish prima facie case, do not prove pretext); Baneree, 648 F.2d at 66 (pattern of
discrimination is of circumstantial value only; it provides no direct or compelling proof); Davis v.
Weidner, 596 F.2d 726, 732 (7th Cir. 1979) (general determinations, though helpful, may not be
controlling as an individual employment decision); and Keyes, 552 F.2d at 580 (mere showing of
male-female salary disparities, without departmental breakdown is inconclusive).
1987]
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causal connection of the challenged employment decision is usually
speculative.
In both Namenwirth 73 and Farow,74 the plaintiffs introduced substan-
tial amounts of independent evidence, including histories of discrimina-
tion by the schools, prejudicial remarks by decisionmakers, and
procedural irregularities. 75 In both cases, 76 the court refused to accord
more than marginal weight to such evidence in the absence of any evi-
dence establishing a causal link to the decision itself.7 7 Logically, a plain-
tiff should be able to establish the requisite causal link more easily in the
case of procedural irregularities, as these are more clearly connected to
the decisionmaking process. However, procedural irregularities are not
as expressly indicative of discriminatory animus as are blatantly prejudi-
cial remarks or harassment.78 Moreover, since the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Board of Regents v. Roth, 7 the lower courts have avoided
decisions that might impose some standard of procedural fairness on
universities. 80
For the plaintiff to succeed, the procedural irregularity must be singu-
73. 769 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir. 1985).
74. 624 F. Supp. 434 (M.D.N.C. 1985).
75. Namenwith was the first woman on the Zoology Department's tenure track in thirty-five
years. She was the only person denied tenure in the history of the department. The university had a
marked history of sex discrimination. In 1978, the ratio of tenured women to total tenured faculty,
within science departments, was 6 to 323. Namenwirth's only tenured female colleague suffered
through fifty years of sexual harassment and discrimination. Adopting an "irregular procedure," the
review committee declined to give Namenwirth a recommendation, because the vote, though
favorable, was too close. 769 F.2d at 1237.
Farlow introduced evidence that Dr. Tyra, the head of her department, had made sexist remarks
to Dr. Joyce Farwell, a female colleague. After Farwell complained about her conditions of employ-
ment, Tyra told her that if she was unhappy she could always sell her body. 624 F. Supp. at 438.
Tyra also said that Farwell's work "wasn't bad for a broad." Id. The court also found that the
university had a lax attitude towards the elimination of discrimination, on the basis of their failure to
follow their own affirmative action plan. Id.
76. The courts respectively found these facts "unusual," 769 F.2d at 1237, and "disturbing,"
624 F. Supp. at 438, but similarly inconclusive.
77. In both Namenwirth and Farlow, the plaintiffs also introduced evidence that similarly quali-
fied male colleagues had received tenure or promotion. Both courts essentially concluded that mak-
ing fine distinctions with respect to academic qualification was the province of the college not the
court.
78. Nanzenwirth, 769 F.2d at 1243.
79. 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (non-tenured faculty member has no due process "property interest" in
continued employment).
80. E.g., King v. University of Minn., 774 F.2d at 224, 227 (8th Cir. 1985) (court will not
review termination of tenured professor de noo, but will only insure he received minimum due
process).
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larly egregious and must clearly impact the challenged decision. For ex-
ample, in Kunda v. Muhlenberg College the court held that failure to
provide adequate counseling concerning a terminal degree requirement
was a pretext for discrimination.81 In Kunda the failure to counsel was
clearly discriminatory, and not just procedurally unfair, because the col-
lege apprised all male candidates of the requirement. 82
Similarly, in Greer v. University of Arkansas Board of Trustees the
court found that the university preselected favored male candidates for
administrative posts.83 The court held that this was a charade and a
pretext for discrimination.84 Furthermore, the plaintiffs introduced sub-
stantial evidence of blatant harassment and their own "demonstrably su-
perior" qualifications. 85
Finally, in Sweeny v. Board of Trustees of Keene State College (Sweeny
11)86 the court performed an independent assessment of the conflicting
views of Sweeny's qualifications. The college denied Sweeny a promotion
over the favorable recommendation of her departmental colleagues,
many of whom testified in her behalf at trial.87 The court did not, how-
81. 621 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1980). The court did not need to reach the issue of Kunda's subjec-
tive qualifications, because the college did not argue that she was unqualified in this respect. The
college gave lack of the proper degree as the sole reason for plaintiff's termination. Id. at 544.
82. In Kunda, the college treated similarly situated individuals differently in terms of providing
necessary information. This information had a material impact on Kunda's employment status. The
school, however, did not violate Title VII by simply failing to provide Kunda with the necessary
information. The school violated Title VII because it treated Kunda differently from males subject
to the same requirement. Id. Cf Hill v. Nettleton, 455 F. Supp. 514 (D. Colo. 1978) (subsequently
imposed degree requirement, not part of original terms of employment, was illegitimate and itself a
pretext for discrimination).
83. 544 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Ark. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Behlar v. Smith, 719 F.2d 950 (5th Cir.
1983).
84. Id. at 1102. Unlike typical non-competitive, subjective tenure decisions, the candidates in
Greer competed for specific administrative posts on the basis of objectively identifiable critieria, such
as administrative experience. The court was willing to make comparisons on the basis of these objec-
tive criteria. Greer, 544 F. Supp. at 1095-98.
85. With respect to Dr. Cornelius, one of the favored male candidates who was particularly
unqualified, the court found:
Dr. Cornelius had little or no supervisory experience. An adequate investigation would
have revealed that he had administered a summer youth sports program and that his per-
formance was unsatisfactory ... so unsatisfactory that the Federal Government threatened
to withdraw funding if Cornelius continued as director. Id. at 1095.
86. 604 F.2d 106 (Ist Cir. 1979). In Sweeney I the court had held that the college failed to meet
its rebuttal burden. 569 F.2d 169 (1st Cir. 1978), vacatedper curiam, 439 U.S. 24 (1978) (for recon-
sideration in light of Furnco).
87. 604 F.2d at 112-13.
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ever, transcend the barrier of presumed evaluator accuracy.,,
In each of the above cases some unique combination of events or a
singularly egregious act contributed to the plaintiff's ultimate success.
None of these cases provides a model for resolution of more typical aca-
demic Title VII suits.8 9 In the typical situation, the court must apply a
"common sense method" 9° for deriving the truth from the totality of cir-
cumstances. The McDonnell Douglas91 approach has proven an inade-
quate device for this task in the academic context. In addition, a debate
currently rages in the circuit courts concerning a plaintiff's right to dis-
covery of potentially crucial evidence.
III. FROM INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY TO
EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGE
Liberal discovery is important to the plaintiff when proof of intent is
an element of the case.92 Plaintiffs in academic Title VII suits often seek
discovery of peer evaluations and other materials generated during the
academic selection process. These materials fall within the broad defini-
88. Id. Cf Flygare, Implications for the Future of Peer Review in Faculty Personnel Decisions,
7 J. OF C. & U. L. 100, 105 (1980-81) (colleges and universities should realize that Sweeney signals
the end of the "hands-off' approach). Since Sweeney II, however, the deluge of judicial interference
predicted by Flygare has yet to occur. Though the court did find for the plaintiff on facts that would
have led most courts to contrary results, Sweeney II is still an exceptional case given the cooperation
from her colleagues. As such, it fails to provide any real model for future judicial action. See also
Jepsen v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 754 F.2d 924, 926 (11th Cir. 1985) (after remand for further
discovery, the district court found that the university's reasons were "dangerously close to outright
admission of sex discrimination"). The Court of Appeals affirmed.
89. Id. In Greer especially, the situation was unique. Not only did the university "preselect"
candidates of "demonstrably inferior" qualification, one of the favored candidates (Cornelius) openly
harassed and discriminated against the plaintiff after acquiring the position. Most of all, Greer does
not speak to the problem of reviewing subjective promotion and tenure decisions. Similarly, a plain-
tiff cannot always count on her colleagues to testify on her behalf, as in Sweeney I. Thus, although
Sweeney II provides a model for protecting individuals from administrative discrimination, it fails to
address the problems of peer group discrimination or conflicting evaluations. Kunda suggests a
useful tool for inferring discrimination, namely that academic decisions are based on evaluation over
a long probationary period. During this employment relationship, the employer might treat the
plaintiff in a discriminatory manner. If this unfair treatment "materially affects" the plaintiff's em-
ployment opportunities, as the failure to provide necessary information did in Kunda, the court
should infer discrimination. Unlike other forms of direct evidence, material unfair treatment is caus-
ally connected to the outcome of the employment decision.
90. Furnco, supra note 38.
91. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
92. Rollins v. Farris, 39 F.E.P. 1102, 1105 (E.D. Ark. 1985) (citations omitted). Liberal dis-
covery is important because direct proof of intent is rarely available and the plaintiff will have to rely
on the totality of facts to raise an inference.
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tion of relevancy under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Under the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may obtain discovery of any
relevant, non-privileged information. 93 Circuit courts have split over rec-
ognition of some form of academic non-disclosure privilege.94
Universities traditionally maintain confidentiality with respect to hir-
ing decisions. They are reluctant to reveal the identities and votes of
those who evaluated the plaintiff (hereinafter "votes") or to provide the
files of other candidates who may be similarly situated (hereinafter "com-
parison files"). 95 Universities assert a privilege based on academic free-
dom. They argue that disclosure of the above materals would have a
chilling effect on free and open deliberation of a candidate's qualifica-
tions, impairing frank and candid discussion necessary to faculty selec-
tion.96 Universities also contend that disgruntled minority candidates
might abuse liberal discovery and conduct fishing expeditions 97 for evi-
dence of discrimination.
93. Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence. FED. R. EVID. 401. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added).
94. Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act of
Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege
of a witness, person, government, state, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in light
of reason and experience. FED. R. EVID. 501.
Traditionally, the law recognizes privileges only in very narrow circumstances when "certain soci-
etal values are more important than the ascertainment of truth." Rollins, 39 F.E.P. at 1105. See 8
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §§ 2191 & 2196 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (society has a right to every
man's evidence).
95. From the plaintiff's perspective this material is particularly probative, as it permits her to
establish the requisite causal connection between other evidence and the decision. On the causal
connection requirement, see Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (plaintiff must show that she was the victim of
discrimination) and supra note 44. On the importance of comparison evidence, see supra note 43.
Universities, on the other hand, find these materials particularly sensitive, arguing that peer evalua-
tion requires an atmosphere of confidentiality. They contend that discovery directed at evaluators as
individuals will have a "chilling effect' on candid evaluation. See Hill and Hill, Rollback of Confi-
dentiality, supra note 20 (discussing conflict between plaintiff's need for evidence and university
interest in confidentiality and integrity of review process).
96. Accord, Hill and Hill, Rollback of Confidentiality, supra note 20 (close relationship between
peer review and academic excellence) and Note, Academic Freedom Privilege, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1538
(1981).
97. See E.E.O.C. v. Franklin & Marshall College, 775 F.2d 110, 119 (3d Cir. 1985) (Aldisert,
C.J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for authorizing fishing expeditions) and E.E.O.C. v. University
of Notre Dame du lac, 715 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1983) (exploratory searches will not be condoned).
Washington University Open Scholarship
462 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 65:445
A. "Posted: No Fishing Allowed"
No court has held academic freedom conveys an absolute non-disclo-
sure privilege, although several circuits have recognized a qualified aca-
demic non-disclosure privilege.98 Functionally, the qualified privilege
raises a rebuttable presumption in favor of non-disclosure. To overcome
this presumption, the plaintiff must demonstrate a need for the evidence
on the basis of the facts and circumstances of the particular case. 99
Though some courts also refer to this as a "balancing approach,"' ' ° the
case-by-case approach is characteristic of qualified privilege. Qualified
privilege courts typically assume that liberal discovery would adversely
impact the tenure process101
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals articulated a test for discovery
based on the defendant's proffered explanation for the employment deci-
sion in Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College.102 The court refused to compel
disclosure because the college had not relied on the materials sought by
98. The Seventh Circuit, in Notre Dame, is the only court to expressly recognize a "qualified
academic privilege." 715 F.2d at 337. Other courts, however, have approaches that are functionally
similar under the rubric of a "balancing approach."
99. This case-by-case balancing approach implicitly recognizes the need to steer between two
extremes. On the one hand, these courts do not wish to compel disclosure of otherwise confidential
material on a routine basis or merely because someone has filed a law suit. On the other hand,'
refusal to afford an absolute privilege, recognizes that in some cases the plaintiff has a legitimate need
for this evidence. The common law also resorts to a balancing approach to determine the existence
of a privilege. 8 WIGMORE §§ 2191-96. Courts balance the plaintiff's need for evidence (society's
interest in the search for truth) against the defendant's interest in maintaining confidentiality (based
on the societal importance of the interest affected).
100. Gray v. Board of Higher Educ., City of New York, 692 F.2d 901 (2d Cir. 1982); Lynn v.
Regents of Univ. of Cal., 656 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1981); Jepsen v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 610 F.2d
1379 (5th Cir. 1980), aff'd on merits after remand, 754 F.2d 294 (1 lth Cir. 1985); and Keyes v.
Lenoir Rhyne College, 552 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1977). See also E.E.O.C. Franklin & Marshall Col-
lege, 775 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1985) (Aldisert, C.J., dissenting).
101. This assumption is the critical distinction between courts that do and courts that do not
recognize some form of academic privilege. Acceptance of the fact that discovery as a matter of
course would adversely impact the tenure process provides the justification for a case-by-case ap-
proach. See supra note 98.
102. 552 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1977). In Keyes the court looked to the reasons articulated by the
defendant under the second step of McDonnell Douglas. The college did not offer reasons such as
specific deficiencies in evaluations, that might implicate the confidential portion of the decisionmak-
ing process. The court's conclusion that these materials were not discoverable under the circum-
stances seems predicated upon a narrowed definition of relevancy. The court in Jepsen used the
Keyes rationale to reach an opposite result, stating:
We find this reasoning to be persuasive where, as here, the university defends a claim of
discrimination on the ground that promotional decisions were based solely on unbiased
faculty evaluations which involved criteria unrelated to sex. 610 F.2d at 1384.
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the plaintiff to justify its actions.1"3 The court concluded that if the
materials were not relevant to the employment decision, they were like-
wise irrelevant as proof of pretext. Likewise, in Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission v. University of Notre Dame, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff must exhaust all other available
sources of evidence before seeking confidential materials."°
Many courts differentiate between votes and comparison files, and
other confidential materials, and impose additional requirements before
compelling disclosure of the former. The court in Notre Dame stated
that disclosure of votes and comparison files only would occur under the
most limited circumstances.' 05 Other circuits have adopted the Keyes
approach as the test for initial discovery, but have expressed different,
often conflicting views concerning continued discovery.
10 6
For example, the courts in Gray v. Board of Higher Education, City of
New York 07 and Lynn v. Regents of the University of California ' per-
mitted broad discovery"°9 for substantially different reasons. In Gray,
the school refused to provide the plaintiff with any explanation of its
actions against him. 11 The Second Circuit concluded that this deprived
the plaintiff of a fair chance to prove his case. Implicitly, the court held
that it would compel discovery only if a school failed to provide a state-
103. 552 F.2d 479 (4th Cir. 1977).
104. 715 F.2d at 338.
105. Id. The Seventh Circuit required a showing of "particularized need" made on a case-by-
case basis. Id. at 339. The opinion did not indicate how this standard would apply. Other courts
have also accepted the view that votes and comparison files are sufficiently unique to warrant special
protection. See, eg., Franklin & Marshall College, 775 F.2d at 117 (Aldisert, C.J., dissenting) (broad
discovery may compromise legitimate privacy expectations of innocent third parties); and Gray, 692
F.2d at 308 (routine discovery of tenure votes could chill frank discussion and engender disharmony
among faculty). Contra, Dinnan, 661 F.2d at 431 (a consequence of decisionmaking responsibility is
to stand up and publicly account for one's actions).
106. A Ninth Circuit district court outlined the basic model for step-by-step discovery. Upon a
showing of relevancy under the Keyes-Jepsen standard, the court will compel initial, limited disclo-
sure, comprised of a written statement of reasons and comprehensive evaluation summaries. The
court will only compel further discovery (of votes and comparison files) if the initial disclosures
contain evidence substantiating the plaintiff's claim. Zautinsky v. University of Cal., 36 F.R.D.2d
83, 86 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
107. 692 F.2d 901 (2d Cir. 1982).
108, 656 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1981).
109. "Broad discovery" means compelled disclosure of votes and comparison files.
110. 692 F.2d at 907-8. The court relied in part on an A.A.U.P. policy, providing for a state-
ment of reasons explaining any denial of tenure. The court concluded that the plaintiff needed at
least some foothold, if he was to have a fair opportunity to pursue his claim. The court clearly
focused on that half of the balancing equation relating to the plaintiff's evidentiary needs. Id.
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ment of reasons.11
In Lynn the Ninth Circuit relied, in part, on the fact that the univer-
sity had provided detailed summaries of the evaluations of the plaintiff.
The court concluded that this undermined the university's interest in
continued confidentiality.112 In both cases, the courts balanced the plain-
tiff's need for the materials against the school's interest in confidentiality.
B. A License to Fish; No License to Discriminate
The Fifth Court abandoned the qualified privilege approach in In re
Dinnan I 3 and affirmed a lower court decision ordering Dinnan to reveal
the vote he cast in a tenure decision. The court stated that academic
freedom did not encompass a privilege to conceal evidence of discrimina-
tion. 1 4 The Third Circuit followed Dinnan in Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission v. Franklin & Marshall College, 115 and ordered the
enforcement of a broad Commission subpoena. 16 In Rollins v. Farris an
Eighth Circuit district court held that any university interest in confiden-
tiality was marginal compared to the plaintiff's right to secure non-dis-
criminatory treatment under Title VII. 17
According to the above cases the effects of disclosure on the peer re-
view process were insignificant. These liberal discovery courts also em-
phasized the Congressional mandate in Title VII118 and resolved the
111. Id.
112. The university provided detailed summaries as a matter of course. 692 F.2d at 1348. Pre-
sumably, the court analogized this to a waiver of privilege. The court clearly focused on that half of
the balancing equation relating to the university's interest in continued confidentiality. The Lynn
holding is more troubling than Gray as a model for future decisions, because the court, in effect,
penalized the defendant for providing a benefit to the plaintiff.
113. 661 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1981).
114. The court distinguished the Sweezy line of cases on the grounds that Dinnan did not involve
government efforts to suppress ideas. Finding no basis in the law for Dinnan's asserted privilege, the
court did not consider a case-by-case balance of interests. Id. at 431. The court also discounted the
possibility of harm to the peer review process. Id. at 431.
115. 775 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1985). See also E.E.O.C. v. University of N.M., Albuquerque, 504
F.2d 1296, 1302 (10th Cir. 1974) (upholding broad E.E.O.C. subpoena powers; "all that is now
required is that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose").
116. "Congress has made clear that the scope of the E.E.O.C.'s subpoena power is limited by the
standard of relevance .... The E.E.O.C. is not limited, as the appellant appears to suggest, to that
which might be relevant to trial. Rather, the E.E.O.C. is entitled to all that is relevant to the charge
under investigation." 775 F.2d at 115, citing, E.E.O.C. v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 54 (1984).
117. 39 F.E.P. 1102, 1105 (E.D. Ark. 1985).
118. See Dinnan, 661 F.2d at 431 ("appellant is frustrating the appellee's attempt to vindicate an
alleged infringement of her statutory and constitutional rights").
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discovery issue without regard to particular facts of each case. 1 9 The
plaintiff can, therefore, rely on the recognized need for liberal discovery
for cases involving proof of intent and the broad provisions in the Fed-
eral Rules. 2° Liberal discovery courts also point to the absence of any
expression of Congressional intent to accord special treatment to aca-
demic institutions.
IV. REDEFINING AN ACADEMIC QUALIFIED NON-DISCLOSURE RULE
The touchstone of any evidentiary burden is the extent to which the
evidence contributes to the search for truth. Society, however, has a cor-
responding responsibility to insure that the duty to provide evidence is
not unnecessarily onerous.1 21 Liberal discovery courts distort the bal-
ancing process, by minimizing the potential harmful effects of disclosure
on the tenure process. The disclosure of votes and comparison files tran-
scends purely institutional concerns, and threatens the interests of indi-
vidual evaluators and other candidates.122
Arguments relying on Congressional intent are equally unpersuasive.
As Chief Judge Aldisert noted, dissenting in Franklin & Marshall Col-
lege, arguments based on what is not in the Congressional record are
tenuous at best.123 The mandate to enforce Title VII against academic
institutions did not, of its own force, prohibit courts from adopting pro-
cedures that protect the interests of potential defendants.
Some form of qualified privilege would strike a balance which accords
119. Liberal discovery courts do perform a balancing of sorts, using the same factors as privilege
courts. While privilege courts resolve the issue as a question of fact, according to the circumstances
of each case, liberal discovery courts have concluded, as a matter of law, that there is no justification
for inhibiting discovery in this context. See Dinnan, 661 F.2d at 431 (relying on statutory Title VII
mandate and lack of any legal basis for privilege).
120. See supra notes 93-94.
121. 8 WIGMORE §§ 2191, 2196.
122. Supra note 105. The harm to the peer review process is not illusory simply because it is
speculative. Of course, in this respect, defendants are in the same position as the plaintiff, who is
unable to prove pretext, because of her inability to carry an unrealistic burden of proof. Defendants
as proponents of the privilege, simply lack the ability to quantify the harm and carry their burden of
proof.
123. 775 F.2d at 119-20. Chief Judge Aldisert stated:
Such an approach requires us to decide if Congress in fact intended uncontrolled intrusion
into the right of privacy and confidentiality implicated in the tenure review of innocent
third parties. It seems unlikely... Congressional intent to eliminate employment discrim-
ination can be fully served without conferring on the E.E.O.C. such absolute and unyield-
ing investigatory powers to embark upon a fishing expedition into confidential materials.
Id. at 120.
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weight to the legitimacy of both interests. A qualified privilege permits a
case-by-case analysis, and avoids an absolute solution that necessarily el-
evates permanently one set of interests over the other. The current quali-
fied privilege approaches, however, employ irrelevant and unnecessarily
burdensome standards.
First, a test for discovery based on the defendant's articulated explana-
tion permits the alleged discriminator to control the course of discov-
ery. 24 A test for continued discovery based on the contents of initial
disclosures is flawed in the same respect. Moreover, the disclosed mater-
ials are of minimum probative value if offered piecemeal. 125
A discovery standard based on the plaintiff's ability to meet a certain
burden of proof using non-confidential evidence would remove these defi-
ciencies. A standard based on the plaintiff's ability to substantiate her
claim also would preclude groundless searches for evidence of discrimi-
nation. 126 The suggested approach can protect schools from unwar-
ranted judicial interference in the selection process. Once the plaintiff
raises a reasonable inference that the challenged decision rests on dis-
criminatory, rather than on academic grounds, the school loses its basis
for asserting a privilege. 127 Society's interest in resolving a now clearly
legitimate dispute then predominates.
At this point, the court should compel liberal discovery and full disclo-
sure of all materials, including votes and comparison files. Liberal dis-
covery is essential, because the plaintiff must rely on "the totality of
facts" to prove intent. Selected bits of information have minimal proba-
tive value with respect to circumstantial proof of intent. Moreover, step-
by-step discovery burdens the judicial process, detracts from resolution
of the ultimate issues, and forces the plaintiff with a legitimate claim to
play a shell game for evidence.1 28
Unfortunately, the benefits of liberal discovery are largely illusory in
124. See supra notes 104-112 and accompanying text. The cited cases rely on either the content
of the defendant's articulated reasons, his failure to articulate reasons, or his over-articulation of
reasons. All of these are within the exclusive control of and subject to manipulation by the
defendant.
125. See supra note 91. Circumstantial proof of intent depends upon the totality of facts.
126. See supra note 99. Groundless, vague investigations and routine intervention pose the
greatest threat to academic freedom. Accord, Sweezy, 354 U.S. 234.
127. Rollins, 39 F.E.P. at 1105.
128. For courts imposing some form of step-by-step discovery, see Notre Dame, 715 F.2d 331
(particularized need); Gray, 692 F.2d 902 (failure to state reasons); Lynn, 656 F.2d 1337 (over-
statement of reasons); and Zautinsky, 36 F.R.S.2d 83 (contempt of reasons). See also Jepsen, 610
F.2d 1379 (no step-by-step).
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the face of judicial refusal to provide meaningful review of this evidence.
In this respect, at least, disclosure imposes an unnecessary burden on
universities. Courts, therefore, need to develop some different mecha-
nism for analyzing academic Title VII suits, and coordinate this method
with the availability of discovery. Part V of this Note suggests such an
alternative mechanism, discusses its relationship to discovery, and con-
siders the appropriate burden of proof for obtaining discovery.
V. AN EFFORT TO STRIKE A MORE EQUITABLE BALANCE
Courts state that under the McDonnell Douglas approach neither the
prima facie case nor the rebuttal burden is onerous.129 Light preliminary
burdens serve to clarify the issues in non-academic disparate treatment
suits. 3° Academic suits, however, require the preliminary disposition of
more substantive issues-a task for which light burdens are inadequate.
The courts have never fully resolved the issue of whether judicial inter-
ference in the academic selection process is warranted. Instead, they
have conferred a defacto immunity upon academic institutions by means
of the irrebuttable presumption of evaluator accuracy. Judges have been
asking the wrong question. The question is not "whether" but "when"
should courts interfere in the academic selection process.
This Note suggests that courts simply confront the issue directly on a
case-by-case basis by means of more substantial preliminary burdens.
129. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
130. "Placing the burden of production on the defendant thus serves simultaneously to meet the
plaintiff's prima facie case by presenting a legitimate reason for the action and to frame the factual
issues with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate
pretext." Id. at 256. The three reasons offered to justify imposing a burden of "mere articulation"
are inapposite to the academic context, largely because of the subjective nature of academic employ-
ment decisions. Even "clear and reasonably specific" reasons are difficult to challenge if expressed in
conclusory, subjective terms. Second, the defendant in an academic Title VII case has little incentive
to "convince" the court of the legality of his reasons. On the contrary, he has an incentive to choose
the most legally defensible reason, regardless of its truth or falsity. With respect to academia, courts
are less likely to question some reasons as opposed to others. A decision purporting to rest squarely
on peer evaluations is virtually unassailable. See, e.g., Namenwirth, 769 F.2d 1235; Zahorik, 729
F.2d 85; and Farlow, 624 F. Supp. 434. In all three cases the courts ultimately deferred to the
expertise of academic evaluators, despite considerable evidence of discrimination.
Finally, "liberal methods of discovery" will not necessarily be available. From the university's
perspective the "ideal defense" is that the plaintiff, though "qualified" fails to fulfill the needs of the
school or is "out of step with the mission of the department." See Banerjee, 648 F.2d 61, and Smith,
632 F.2d 316. First, this defense is difficult to refute. Second, because the defense does not rely on
the contents of peer evaluations, the university is not subject to discovery under the Keyes-Jepsen
approach. Finally, like other matters within the defendant's exclusive control, this defense is easily
manipulated.
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The problem is not the presumed accuracy of academic evaluators, but
rather the tacit irrebuttability of this presumption. The McDonnell
Douglas"'3 approach is inadequate.
This Note suggests the following procedure. The plaintiff should bear
the initial burden of establishing the prima facie case of discrimination,
but the burden would be substantially higher than under McDonnell
Douglas.'32 If the plaintiff meets this burden, the court would compel
discovery according to the method described in Part IV of this Note.133
At this point, the court has determined that judicial intervention is
proper.
In the second step, the plaintiff has the burden of showing that dis-
crimination stands in equal probability with the defendant's stated rea-
sons as an explanation of the challenged decision. If the plaintiff meets
this second burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to persuade the
court that the decision was legitimate and non-discriminatory. 34
In order to meet the initial burden and establish a prima facie case, the
131. 411 U.S. 792.
132. Id. See supra note 39 (outlining elements of prima facie case). See also supra note 129
(despite non-onerous prima facie case burden, plaintiff can rarely prove pretext). Even under a
heightened prima facie case standard, the plaintiff would not have to "prove that she was qualified."
See supra note 62. The precise standard is difficult to articulate, because it would have to rest on an
inquiry into the facts and circumstances of each case. The following is a suggestion:
(1) The inquiry would focus on the propriety of judicial intervention. The court would ask
the central question, "does the plaintiff's evidence raise a substantial inference of dis-
crimination, that outweighs the defendant's interest in maintaining confidentiality and
feedom from routine judicial intervention?"
Functionally, this would operate in a manner analogous to the business judgment rule, another area
where society prefers that experts rather than courts routinely run things. The inquiry itself would
be different of course.
(2) The plaintiff should have to prove by a preponderance of the evidence:
a. that at least some actors in the decisionmaking process harbor discriminatory
animus;
b. that she herself was differentially treated or victimized in "some respect,"
though not necessarily in a manner linked to the decisionmaking process.
(3) The plaintiff would have to show that a genuine dispute exists as to:
a. whether she is qualified;
b. whether she can show a causal connection between inferences of discrimination
and the adverse decision.
133. Supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. Given the Burdine-Sweezy-Furnco trilogy, the
Supreme Court must take the initiative. Other commentators have advocated either shifting the
burden of persuasion upon establishment of a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case or applying the
disparate impact test. See Young, Sex Discrimination, supra note 2; Cooper, Barriers, supra note 2;
Stacy and Holland, Statistical Problems, supra note 5; and Bartholet, Jobs in High Places, supra note
5. This Note foresees the necessity of shifting the burden of persuasion at some point. Shifting the
burden is the price for retaining the subjective decisionmaking process.
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plaintiff would have to turn to a new type of evidence. This evidence
consists of procedural irregularities and differential treatment that di-
rectly impaired the plaintiff's scholarly development. Such evidence is
currently available and could be exploited more fully even under the ex-
isting approach. 135 As a corollary, courts would have to be more recep-
tive to arguments based on procedural irregularities. 36
To meet the prima facie case burden the plaintiff would first have to
demonstrate that she was arguably qualified-that is, that her qualifica-
tions were at least a debatable proposition. Second, she would have to
show that she suffered from some form of discriminatory or differential
treatment, regardless of the connection to the decisionmaking process.
Third, she would have to show a pattern of disparate effects or a history
of discrimination with respect to the defendant's employment results. Fi-
nally, she would have to raise an inference of a causal relationship with
the challenged decision by evidence of procedural irregularities and ma-
terial mistreatment.
In order to shift the full burden of proof to the defendant, the plaintiff
must satisfy a burden just short of proving pretext. Under this approach,
the burden of proof is the defendant's in close cases, such as Namenwirth
and Farlow. These two cases provide the best illustration of the precise
burden that the plaintiff would have to meet.
The same arguments supporting judicial restraint justify shifting the
burden of proof in this manner. If judges truly lack the expertise neces-
sary to evaluate academic qualifications, the burden should fall on the
party having the requisite expertise, once the plaintiff has shown that
discrimination is an equally probable explanation for the challenged deci-
sion. The substantial preliminary burdens should adequately protect de-
cisions made "on academic grounds" and prevent routine judicial
intervention. While the plaintiff's burdens are substantial, they are not
insurmountable. The victim of discrimination has a realistic opportunity
135. Material mistreatment would include conduct occurring during the probationary period
which would tend to deny plaintiff information, opportunities for development or recognition, or an
equal degree of participation in scholarly activities. Mistreatment alone, however, would be insuffi-
cient. Courts should not impose abstract standards of fairness. The plaintiff would have to show
that traditionally favored candidates received the benefits which she did not. Examples include dis-
parate teaching assignments or feedback on different candidates' work-in other words, conduct that
might cause a deficiency impacting the blend of qualifications observed by unbiased evaluators.
136. See Kunda, supra notes 80-81. As with material mistreatment, the court would focus upon
comparing the procedural treatment of different candidates, not on whether the procedures met
some abstract standard of fairness.
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to obtain meaningful review of her claim. This approach, though com-
plex, recognizes the legitimacy of both the plaintiff's and the defendant's
interests, as well as the unique and complex nature of academic
employment.
William A. Kohlburn
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